Abstract. Search frictions can explain why the "law of one price"fails in retail markets and why even …rms selling commodity products have pricing power. In online commerce, physical search costs are low, yet price dispersion is common. We use browsing data from eBay to estimate a model of consumer search and price competition when retailers o¤er homogeneous goods. We …nd that retail margins are on the order of 10%, and use the model to analyze the design of search rankings. Our model explains most of the e¤ects of a major re-design of eBay's product search, and allows us to identify conditions where narrowing consumer choice sets can be pro-competitive. We also discuss some of the di¢ culties in designing e¤ective algorithms to rank seller o¤erings.
Introduction
Search frictions play an important role in retail markets. They help explain how retailers maintain positive mark-ups even when they compete to sell identical goods, and why price dispersion is so ubiquitous. In online commerce, the physical costs of search are much lower than in traditional o-ine settings. Yet studies of e-commerce routinely have found substantial price dispersion (Bailey, 1998; Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001; Baye, Morgan and Scholten, 2004; Einav et al., 2013) . And despite the general view that the internet has increased retail price competition, we are not aware of a de…nitive study measuring online mark-ups, or comparing them to current or past o-ine mark-ups.
Consumers shopping online can use price search engines or compare prices at e-commerce marketplaces such as eBay or Amazon. For the most part, these platforms want to limit search frictions and provide consumers with transparent and low prices (Baye and Morgan, 2001 ). Retailers may have very di¤erent incentives. Many retailers, and certainly those with no particular cost advantage, would like to di¤erentiate or even "obfuscate" their o¤erings to limit price competition (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012) . This raises the question of how di¤erent ways of structuring online search, such as alternative search rankings or displays, a¤ect price competition and consumer purchasing patterns.
In this paper, we use a model of consumer search and price competition to estimate search frictions and online retail margins, and to study the e¤ects of search design. We estimate the model using browsing data from eBay. A nice feature of internet data is that it is possible to track exactly what each consumer sees. As a practical matter, consumers often evaluate only a handful of products, even when there are many competing sellers. With standard transaction data, incorporating this requires the introduction of a new latent variable, the consumer's "consideration set"; that is, the set of products the consumer actually chooses between (e.g. Goeree, 2008) . Here, we adopt the consideration set approach, but use browsing data to recover it.
We use the model to estimate consumer demand and retail margins, and then to analyze a large-scale redesign of the search process on eBay. Prior to the redesign, consumers entering a search query were shown individual o¤ers drawn from a larger set of potential matches, ranked according to a relevance algorithm. The redesign broke consumer search into two steps: …rst prompting consumers to identify an exact product, then comparing seller listings of that product head-to-head, ranked (mostly) by price. We discuss in Section 2 how variations on these two approaches are used by many, if not most, e-commerce platforms.
To motivate the analysis, we show in Section 3 that across a fairly broad set of consumer product categories, re-organizing the search process is associated with both a change in purchasing patterns and a fall in the distribution of posted prices. After the change, transaction prices fell by roughly 5-15% for many products. We also point out that all of these categories are characterized by a wide degree of price dispersion, and by di¢ culties in accurately classifying and …ltering relevant products. Despite a very large number of sellers o¤ering high-volume products, consumers see only a relatively small fraction of o¤ers, and regularly do not buy from the lowest-price seller. That is, search frictions appear to be prevalent despite the low physical search costs associated with internet browsing. We propose our model of consumer demand and price competition in Section 4, and estimate it for a speci…c product, the Halo Reach video game. We …nd that even after incorporating limited search, demand is highly price sensitive. Price elasticities are on the order of -10. We do …nd some degree of consumer preference across retailers, especially for sellers who are "top-rated", a characteristic that eBay ‡ags conspicuously in the search process. We also use the model to decompose the sources of seller pricing power and the high degree of homogeneous product price dispersion into three sources: variation in seller costs, perceived seller di¤erentiation, and search frictions.
We estimate the model using data from before the search redesign. In Section 6, we apply the model (out-of-sample) to analyze the search redesign. The model can explain, both qualitatively and quantitatively, many of its e¤ects: a reduction in posted prices, a shift toward lower-priced purchases, and consequently a reduction in transaction prices. The redesign had the e¤ect of increasing the set of relevant o¤ers exposed to consumers, and prioritizing low price o¤ers. We …nd that the latter e¤ect is by far the most important in terms of increasing price sensitivity and competitive pressure. In fact, we …nd that under the redesigned selection algorithm that prioritizes low prices, narrowing the number of listings shown to sellers tends to increase, rather than decrease, price competition.
In analyzing the search redesign, we apply the model out-of-sample because we are interested in how well simple equilibrium models can do in predicting the e¤ects of platform changes. A common approach among internet platforms is to rely on A/B testing. Subsequent to the redesign, eBay did in fact run a fairly extensive A/B test. In the …nal part Our paper is related to an important literature on search frictions and price competition that dates back to Stigler (1961) . Recent empirical contributions include Hortacsu and Syverson (2003) , Hong and Shum (2006) , and Hortacsu et al. (2013) . A number of papers speci…cally have tried to assess price dispersion in online markets (e.g. Bailey, 1998; Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001; Baye, Morgan and Scholten, 2004; Einav et al., 2013) , to estimate price elasticities (e.g. Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Einav et al., forthcoming) , or to show that consumer search may be relatively limited (Malmendier and Lee, 2011) . [Additional references to be added.]
Search Design in Online Markets
There are at least two dimensions of consumer search in online markets. The …rst is to guide consumers toward products in which they might be interested, either in response to a user query, or through advertising or product suggestions. The second is to help consumers …nd a retailer o¤ering an attractive price for a product the consumer knows that he wants. In this paper we focus on the latter problem of "price search", although it may be somewhat broader if consumers perceive sellers as somewhat di¤erentiated.
We start in this section by describing how di¤erent online platforms approach the price search problem. Platforms have to identify a relevant set of o¤ers, and present the information to consumers. Identifying relevant o¤ers is easier when products have well-de…ned SKUs or catalog numbers. But as we will note below, it is still a di¢ cult problem for platforms that have tens of thousands of di¤erent listed products. Platforms also take di¤erent approaches to presenting information. A typical consideration is whether to try to present all the relevant products in a single ordered list that attempts to prioritize items of highest interest, or try to classify products into sets of "identical"products, and then order products within each set based on price or other vertical attributes. Figure 1 contrasts the approaches of three prominent e-commerce sites. Each panel shows the search results that follow a query for "playstation 3." At the top, Craigslist presents a list of items that it judges to be relevant, ordered by listing date. The buyer must navigate what is potentially a long and loosely …ltered list to …nd his ideal match. On the other hand, because the top listings are recent, the item is more likely to still be available than in lower listings, which helps to address the fact that Craigslist listings do not necessarily disappear if the seller stocks out. In the bottom panel, Amazon takes the other extreme. It highlights a single product model (the 160 GB version) and quotes the lowest price. Buyers can change the model, or click through to see a list of individual sellers, ordered by price. In the middle panel, Google Shopping takes a somewhat intermediate approach.
These approaches to search design illustrate some trade-o¤s. Erring on the side of inclusiveness makes it more di¢ cult for a buyer to …nd the lowest price for a speci…c well-de…ned product. On the other hand, it allows for serendipitous matches, and provides more opportunities to sellers who may be less professional in categorizing their products. The latter approach works well for a shopper interested in price comparisons, and would seem to promote price competition, provided that the platform is able to accurately identify and classify listings according to the product being o¤ered. At the same time, as Ellison and Ellison (2009) have highlighted, it may provide sellers with a strong incentive to search for unproductive tactics that avoid head-to-head price competition.
The redesign of eBay's search process is interesting because it allows for a comparison of these approaches, as shown in Figure 2 . The top panel shows eBay's traditional listings page. It is generated by an algorithm that …rst …lters listings based on query terms, and then presents the listings according to a ranking order. The default is a relevance ranking that eBay calls "Best Match".
1 Users can change the sort order or re…ne their search in various ways. Unlike some search results on the internet, the Best Match algorithm is not tailored to individual users. It also does not consider price explicitly, although it considers factors that may be correlated with price. While it may seem strange that price isn't an explicit factor, it is less surprising when one appreciates the di¢ culty of …ltering the set of products. For example, re-sorting on the displayed page on price would have yielded cheap accessories (e.g. cables or replacement buttons or controllers).
In 2011, eBay introduced an alternative two-stage search design. A buyer …rst sees the relevant product models (e.g. a user who searches for "iPhone"sees "Black iPhone 4s 16GB
(AT&T)" and other models). The buyer then clicks on the model to see a "product page"
with speci…c listings, shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2 . 2 The product page has a prominent "Buy Box" that displays the top-rated seller with the lowest posted price (plus shipping). Then there are two columns of listings, one for auctions and one for posted prices.
The posted price listings are ranked in order of price plus shipping (and the …rst listing may be cheaper than the Buy Box if the lowest-price seller is not top-rated). The auction listings are ranked so that the auction ending soonest is on top. We will not focus on auctions, which represent 33% of the transactions for the products on which we focus.
E¤ect of Platform Change on Search and Prices
To help motivate the model and the analysis below, we start by presenting some descriptive statistics from before and after the search redesign. The new product page was introduced on May 19, 2011. 3 However, the traditional listing page remained the default view for buyers. The new product page became the default presentation of search results for …ve large categories -cell phones, digital cameras, textbooks, video games, and video game systems -over a one-week period from June 27, 2011 to July 2, 2011. Table 1 shows statistics for these …ve categories in the period before the product page was introduced (4/6/11 to 5/18/11) and the period after the introduction was completed (8/1/11 to 9/20/11). We drop the intermediate period during which the product page was available, but not the default. We also exclude the month of July to allow some time for sellers to respond to the platform redesign. The sample period covers nearly half a year, so one potential concern is that there may have been changes in the set of products available, especially in the categories with shorter product life cycles. To deal with this, we restrict attention to the ten products in each category that were most commonly transacted in the week before the product page became the default. 4 (As an example, a typical product in the cell phone category is the black, 16 GB iPhone4 for use with AT&T.) We also show statistics for the narrower product category of iPhone 4.
Several patterns are clear in the data. There are many listings for each product. The average number of listings ranges from 16 to 41 across the …ve categories. There is also remarkable variation in prices. The average ratio of the 75th percentile price to the 25th percentile price is 1.22 in cell phones, 1.32 in digital cameras, and higher in the other categories. The extreme prices, especially on the high end are even more dramatic. Consumers generally do not purchase at the lowest price. In the period before the redesign the average purchase price often was around the 25-40th percentile of the price distribution. As an example, in the digital camera category, consumers pay on average around 18% more than if they had selected the 10th percentile price.
The comparison between the two periods is also informative. With one exception (video game systems), transacted prices fell in every category after the new product page was introduced. The fall was relatively small in the cell phone and video game categories (2.1% and 7.7%, respectively), and larger in digital cameras and textbooks (15.7% and 15.9%).
The decrease does not appear to be driven by a general time trend. The qualitative results remain similar when we control for product-speci…c (linear) time trends. In part, the drop in transacted prices re ‡ects a fall in the posted prices that were being o¤ered. Posted prices fell in every category (again, with the exception of video game systems), by between 0.9% and 17.7%.
Several statistics are suggestive of changes in consumer search. In every category except one, consumers after the redesign purchased items that were cheaper relative to the current distribution of prices. The share of purchases from top-rated sellers also increased markedly for many of the products. Both of these results seem fairly natural. The redesigned search selects and sorts listings by price, focusing attention on the low-price o¤ers, and the product page "Buy Box"especially promotes the low-priced top-rated seller.
5 Figure 3 presents a …nal piece of descriptive evidence, that is also consistent with a change in consumer search patterns after the redesign. The …gure is constructed using browsing data for a single product, the video game Halo Reach, which we use to estimate our model below.
The top panel shows the distribution of relevant Halo Reach o¤ers that were displayed to each consumer following a targeted search, before and after the change in the search design.
The size of the consumer "consideration set"increased sharply. The second panel shows the distribution of the total number of clicks made in a browsing session, for consumers who ended up purchasing. After the search redesign, consumers generally clicked fewer times on their way to a purchase, consistent with a more streamlined process.
These results provide a descriptive and qualitative sense of the overall e¤ects of the platform change. After the change, transaction prices fell for many products. This appears to a have resulted from both a change in purchasing patterns and a fall in the distribution of posted prices. In the next section we develop and estimate a more complete model of the underlying economic primitives. The model allows us to explain the degree of price dispersion and the purchasing patterns in the data, and separate the demand and pricing incentive e¤ects of the platform change, as well as to evaluate alternative platform changes not present in the data.
Model
In this section, we describe a model of consumer search and price competition. Below, we estimate the model's parameters using data from a single product market. We use the estimates to quantify search frictions, the importance of retailer and listing heterogeneity, the size of retailer margins, and the way that the platform re-design a¤ected these quantities.
The model's ingredients are fairly standard. Each potential buyer considers a speci…c and limited set of products. He or she then chooses the most preferred. This is modeled as a traditional discrete choice problem. Sellers set prices in a Nash Equilibrium, taking into account buyer demand. The role of the platform is to shape consumer search. Rather than considering all available products, consumers consider the ones suggested by the platform.
We take advantage of detailed browsing histories to explicitly collect data on each buyer's consideration set. In this context, search rankings a¤ect the set of considered products, and hence consumer choices, and indirectly, the incentives for price competition.
Consumer Demand
We consider a market in which, at a given point in time, there are a large number of di¤erent sellers o¤ering a given product. In our current speci…cation, we allow sellers to vary only by their price p and by whether they are top-rated seller (denoted T RS). We attribute any additional di¤erentiation to a logit error. We assume that consumer i's utility from seller j is given by
where ij is distributed Type I extreme value and is independent of the seller's price and
The main distinction of the model comes in analyzing the consideration set. The consideration set is denoted by J i , such that J i J , where J is the set of all available o¤erings on the platform. We assume that the outside good, good 0, which represents either not buying the product or buying it via another sales channel or by auction, is also part of the consideration set. It has utility u i0 = " i0 , where " i0 is also an independent Type I extreme value random variable. Consumers choose the utility-maximizing option in their consideration set.
To estimate the demand parameters, we rely on our browsing data to identify the consideration sets of a large sample of buyers, and their resulting choices. Speci…cally, we assume the consideration set includes all the listings on the page seen by the consumer following his last search query. This is usually the listings page prior to the platform re-design, and the product page afterwards. With an observable consideration set for each buyer, demand estimation is straightforward using the familiar multinomial logit choice probabilities.
Consideration Sets
In order to analyze pricing decisions, and make "out-of-sample"predictions, we also develop a simple econometric model of how consideration sets are formed. To do this, we assume that consumer i observes the o¤ers of L i sellers, where L i is random. We estimate its distribution directly from the data, that is, by measuring the frequency with which observed consideration sets include a given number of relevant listings. We assume that L i is independent of any particular buyer characteristics, or the distribution of prices.
Which sellers make it into the consideration set? Prior to the re-design, we noted that price did not factor directly into search ranking, but that after the re-design, it played a predominant role. In practice, the complexity of the search ranking and …ltering algorithms, which must be general enough to work for every possible search query and product, as well as factors such as which server provides the results, adds less purposeful (and perhaps unintentional) elements to what results are shown.
To capture this, we adopt a stochastic model of how sellers are selected onto the displayed page. Speci…cally, we assume that products are sampled from the set of available products J t , such that each product j 2 J t is associated with a sampling weight of
and consumer i's consideration set is then constructed by sampling L i products from J i , without replacement. This implies that the consideration set is drawn from a Wallenius' non-central hypergeometric distribution. We assume that prior to the platform change o¤ers enter the consideration set independent of their price, so = 0. For the period after the platform change, we expect > 0 so that lower price items are disproportionately selected into the consideration set. Below we estimate using the browsing data on which items are shown on each product page.
Pricing Behavior
We model seller pricing using a standard Nash Equilibrium assumption. Each seller sets its price to solve
Here D j (p j ) is the probability a given buyer at period t selects j's product, given the set of o¤erings J . From a seller's perspective, D j (p j ) depends on how consumers form their consideration sets, as well as the choices they make given their options. Using the logit choice probabilities, we have:
Another important consideration here is the set (J ) of competing items that the seller has in mind when it sets its price. We assume that the seller optimizes against the set of competing items and prices that are available on eBay during the approximately one month (either "before" or "after") period considered. One argument for this assumption is that in principle sellers can change their price at any time for no cost, so that current listings are the most relevant. Of course, in practice sellers do not change prices that often, so one could reasonably consider price-setting decisions that take into account the (stochastic) set of competing products over the entire lifetime of the listing. This is beyond the scope of the current paper; see Backus and Lewis (2012) and Knoep ‡e (in progress) for related work.
To understand the seller's pricing incentives, it is useful to write
where A j is the probability that the listing enters the consideration set given p j and J , and Q j is the probability that the consumer purchases item j conditional on being in the listing set. With this notation, the optimal price p j satis…es:
where D , A , Q are respective price elasticities. When > 0, reducing price increases demand in two ways: by making it more likely that the seller ends up in the consideration set ( A > 0) and by making it more likely that the consumer picks the seller, conditional on the seller being in the choice set ( Q > 0). Increasing intensi…es the …rst e¤ect. In addition, increasing e¤ectively faces each seller with tougher competition conditional on making it into the consideration set, by reducing the likely prices of the other sellers who are selected.
Discussion
The model we have chosen has only a handful of parameters. A main reason is that we wanted something easy to estimate and potentially "portable"across products, but yet with enough richness to be interesting. The assumptions we have chosen relate fairly closely to some of the classic search models in the literature. For example, in Stahl's (1989) There are several obvious directions in which our model can be extended and we have explored some of them. One is to allow for more heterogeneity among sellers or consumers.
Including more seller heterogeneity seems unlikely to change the model's performance very much. It might be more interesting to distinguish between price-elastic "searchers" and price-inelastic "convenience" shoppers, as in Stahl (1989) or Ellison (2005) . We also have not focused on search rank. In their study of a price search engine, Ellison and Ellison (2009) …nd page order, especially …rst position, to be very important, and it is perceived to be very important in sponsored search advertising. We have estimated versions of our model that include page order, but decided not to focus on these versions. One reason is that the e¤ect of page order in our data seems to be far less dramatic than in sponsored search. The estimates also are much harder to interpret, a signi…cant drawback given the modest increase in explanatory power. 
Empirical Estimates
We now describe the data we use to estimate the model parameters, and the parameter estimates.
Estimation Sample
For this part of the paper, we focus on a single, well-de…ned product: the popular Microsoft The data for the analysis come directly from eBay. They include all listing-level characteristics as well as individual user searches. We can observe every aspect of the search 6 One reason for this is that, to the extent that rank and price are correlated, it is somewhat challenging to identify the two terms separately. Another issue is that pages tend to include many "irrelevant" items (accessories, etc.) as well as auctions, which makes for many complicated modeling decisions in terms of whether to include absolute rank, or relative rank among "relevant" listings, or some mixture of the two.
process, including what the user saw and her actions. We use data from two periods: the "before" period from April 6 until May 18, 2011, and the "after" period, which we de…ne to be August 1 until September 20, 2011. 7 The search data consist of all visits to the Halo Reach product page as well as all visits to the standard search results page derived from query terms that include the words "xbox" (or "x-box"), "halo," and "reach." We drop searches or product page visits that do not result in at least one click on a Halo Reach item.
This results in 1; 527 visits to the search results page (1; 297 of them in the pre-period) and 3; 950 visits to the product page (190 in the pre-period).
8
As search results often include extraneous results while the product page only shows items that are listed under "Halo Reach"in eBay's catalog, we identify listings as the "Halo
Reach"video game if eBay catalogued them as such. We also visually inspected each listing's title to verify that the listing is for just the video game. Illustrating the di¢ culty of precisely …ltering listings, even after we restrict attention to listings catalogued as Halo Reach, we found that 12% of listings were not Halo Reach-related, and 33% were not the game itself (e.g. they were accessories). Items in this second group often seemed to have very low or high prices, so we dropped all listings with prices below $15 or above $100, in case we failed to identify them based on listing title alone. We also restrict the analysis to new items, listed either with a posted price, or as an auction but with a Buy-It-Now price.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, sellers are allowed to change a listing's price even after it has been listed. When this happens, we always observe whether there has been a price change, and we observe the price if there was a transaction, or is a user in our search data clicked on the item, or if it was the …nal posted price of the listing. This leaves a relatively small number of cases where we have a listing for which we know the price was changed but 7 As before, we drop July 2-31, 2011, when the product page was the default because our descriptive analysis in Section 3 suggested that price adjustment did not happen immediately and we want to use an equilibrium model for prediction. The predictive …t is similar for demand if we include July, and a bit worse for pricing. 7 This choice mainly a¤ects the de…nition of the outside option in the demand model. Results are largely similar when we use alternative de…nitions of the outside option.
8 The "product page" in the pre-period was more rudimentary than one introduced on May, 19 (see footnote 3), and relatively few people navigated to it.
8 According to eBay, "new" items must be unopened and usually still have the manufacturer's sealing or original shrink wrap. The auction listings with a Buy-It-Now price have a posted price that is available until the …rst bid has been made. We only consider these listings during the period prior to the …rst bid.
do not observe the exact price because the listing was ignored during this period. We drop these listings from the analysis. Future work may consider econometric methods to deal with these prices. Particularly for items on the new product pages with missing prices, we can bound the price by the surrounding results because the results are sorted by lowest price. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the "before" and "after" periods. The numbers of sellers and listings are slightly lower in the "after" period, and more of the listings come from top-rated sellers. These di¤erences, particularly the increase in top-rated seller listings, could be a consequence of the platform change. In addition, the mean and median list prices both drop by about $2 in the "after" period, which is consistent with the earlier results on a broader set of products in Section 3, and with the hypothesis that competitive pressure increased after the platform change.
Descriptive Statistics
The bottom panel in Table 2 shows statistics on searches. Consumers saw lower prices in the "after" period, and a larger fraction of searches resulted in purchases (13.0% compared to 10.3%). Recall that in Figure 3 , displayed earlier, we already showed that there was a signi…cant increase in the number of relevant listings consumers saw after a search. We also showed in Figure 3 that eventual purchasers seem to have had an easier time getting to the point of sale: eventual purchasers had to click fewer times after the platform change.
Model Estimates
To estimate the parameters of the model, we use the data on consumer choices and consideration set sizes to estimate the demand parameters, and then impose an assumption of optimal pricing to back out the implied marginal costs of each seller.
Estimating the demand parameters is straightforward. As described earlier, we have a standard logit demand with individual-level data and observed individual-speci…c consideration sets. We estimate the demand parameters using maximum likelihood, restricting attention only to consumer data from the "before" period. The results appear in the …rst column of Table 3 . The top-rated seller (TRS) indicator is quite important. It is equivalent to nearly a $10 price discount (o¤ an average price of less than $40!). Recall that in the "before" period, there is no advantage given to TRS sellers that is analogous to the "Buy Box" introduced in the search re-design, so this e¤ect is really very large. Price also has a very large e¤ect. The price elasticity implied by the estimates is about -10. It is even higher (closer to -13) for TRS sellers. The pro…t margin implied by these estimates is about 10%: $3.23 for TRS sellers and just over $4 for other sellers. The next step is to estimate the consideration set model. We obtain the empirical distribution of L i (the number of items sampled by a consumer) directly from the browsing data, and separately for the "before"and "after"periods (see Figure 3) . We also use the browsing data to estimate the sampling parameter in equation (2) that determines the extent to which cheaper listings are more likely to enter the results page. For the "before" period, we assumed = 0. For the "after" period, we estimate using maximum likelihood and obtain an estimate of 0.81 (with a standard error of 0.18). This implies that a ten percent reduction in the posted price would, on average, make the listing 29% more likely to be part of a consumer's consideration set.
The last step is to estimate seller costs. From the seller's optimization problem, we have:
where D jt depends on the search process and consumer choices. We use the estimated demand parameters from the …rst estimation stage, combined with the consideration set model to obtain estimates of D jt and D 0 jt for every seller in the "before" period. Then we use the …rst order condition above to back out the cost c j that rationalizes each seller's price as optimal.
The implied cost distribution is presented in Figure 4 , which also shows the optimal pricing functions for both TRS and non-TRS sellers. We estimate a fair amount of dispersion in seller costs. The 25th percentile of the cost distribution is just slightly under $30; the 75th percentile is $40. There are also a considerable number of sellers who post extremely high prices. Thirteen percent post prices above $50, and …ve percent post prices about $60! To rationalize these prices, we infer that these most extreme sellers all have costs about $59.
We also investigated whether the implied cost distribution was sensitive to our assumptions about the consideration set. Interestingly, it is not. Re-estimating the model under the assumption that consumers consider the entire set of available items leads to a similar cost distribution. This likely re ‡ects the fact that prior to the platform re-design, the observed consideration sets are quite representative, in terms of listed prices, of the full set of listings.
Applying the Model
In this section, we use the estimated model to evaluate the search redesign and compare the model predictions to the data. Then we apply the model to consider various ways of reducing search frictions and to identify the sources of online price dispersion. [We also hope to compare the model's out-of-sample predictions to a large A/B test performed by eBay subsequent to the product redesign, but this analysis is not yet completed.]
The Search Redesign
We use our estimates to assess the e¤ects of the search re-design. To do this, we combine our demand and cost estimates from the "before" period, with our estimates of the consideration set process from the "after" period. We then use this combined model to calculate equilibrium prices and expected sales with the post-redesign search process, assuming that consumer choice behavior and the seller cost distribution remains unchanged. The results from this exercise are reported in Table 3, and Figures 5 and 6. A main e¤ect of the platform change was to make demand more responsive to seller prices. Figure 5 provides a visual illustration of this change in incentives. It shows the implied non-parametric demand curves, for TRS and non-TRS sellers, for both periods.
After the platform redesign, demand became considerably more elastic, with the largest e¤ect for TRS sellers. The implication is that seller margins should fall. The bottom panel of Table 4 shows that the optimal margin for a median TRS seller fell from $3.23 (or 9% of price) to $2.70, and from $4.06 to $3.23 for a median non-TRS seller, implying a roughly twenty percent fall in pro…t margins. Figure 6 compares the distribution of posted prices implied by our model, in the "before" and "after" periods, along with the observed distribution in the "after"period. The predicted and observed distributions are reasonably close to each other, despite the fact that the distribution of prices in the "after"period is not used in the estimation, indicating that our model's out-of-sample predictions appear to match quite well with what actually happened.
The last lines of Table 4 also show the consumer purchase rates implied by the model, as compared to the actual data. The model predicts a substantial increase in purchase rates (from 10.6% to 12.3%), but slightly less than what we actually observe in the data.
The platform change a¤ected purchasing patterns in several distinct ways, highlighted in the top panel of Table 4 . First, as we already showed in Figure 3 , there was a noticeable increase in the size of consideration sets, and a much smaller chance of seeing just a single relevant listing. In addition, price became an important factor in entering the consideration set. With our estimate of = 0:81 for the after period, a ten percent price reduction increases the odds of appearing in the consideration set from 0.24 to 0.31, providing sellers with a new incentive to reduce prices. Finally, there was an increase in the number of listings available on the site, which may or may not have been directly related to the redesign.
Making price a factor in selecting what listings to show to consumers was by far the most important for seller incentives and purchase rates. This can be seen in Table 4 . The Table shows calculations using the model in which we start from the "before" parameters and separately analyze the increase in listings, the increase in consideration set size, and the increase in . In these calculations, the increased size of consideration sets has only a small e¤ect on margins and purchase rates. The same is true for the increase in the number of sellers. The change in is responsible for essentially the entire change in the model predictions for the before and after period.
Search Frictions and Price Dispersion
At the beginning of the paper, we posed the question of why internet prices for homogeneous goods are so dispersed, despite the seemingly low search costs. Prices in our sample, as in earlier studies, exhibit a high degree of dispersion. The estimated model provides a way for us to understand the source of this dispersion, and also the source of seller margins.
In particular, the model o¤ers three ways in which outcomes might di¤er from the sim-plest homogeneous good Bertrand pricing environment: dispersion in costs; search frictions that provide market power and perhaps equilibrium price dispersion; and perceived seller di¤erentiation that supports positive seller margins.
We analyze these factors in Table 5 . The Table compares equilibrium outcomes for variations of the model that di¤er along two dimensions. Across the columns, we vary the degree of search frictions. In the …rst and second columns, we consider the "before" and "after" search regimes. In the third column, we assume that all Halo Reach listings on the platform enter each consumer's consideration set. Across the two rows, we vary the degree of product di¤erentiation. The "di¤erentiation" model assumes the estimated logit demand, in which each seller enjoys some market power. In the "limited di¤erentiation" model, we assume that all sellers share the same nested logit term, putting less weight on their idiosyncratic logit error. Speci…cally, the two scenarios are special cases of the standard nested logit demand model in which the outside good is one nest and all the "inside goods" in another (Berry, 1994) . The "seller di¤erentiation" assumes = 1, which reduces the model to the logit case we estimate, while the "limited seller di¤erentiation"model assumes = 0:2, which reduces the weight places on the seller-speci…c error and thus make the products much less di¤erentiated.
In all six scenarios, we …x the distribution of seller costs (as shown in Figure 4) , and draw costs for each seller on the platform (for the Before period mean number of sellers of 19) from this distribution. Sellers are assumed to set prices knowing the assumptions about consumer search and choice behavior, but without knowledge of the exact realization of opponents'costs. To solve for equilibrium prices and mark-ups, we start from the original price distribution and update sellers'prices one-by-one using their …rst-order conditions with the counterfactual model and the new price distribution. We continue iterating over sellers until every seller's …rst-order condition simultaneously holds.
The results can be used to understand both the source of seller margins and the sources of price dispersion. First consider the case with no search costs and limited product differentiation. In this scenario, sellers sustain positive margins only because there is some possibility that they have a strictly lower cost than all competing sellers (as in the incomplete information pricing model of Spulber, 1995) . The median mark-up is less than $1, and the average transaction price is $24. There is considerable dispersion in posted prices, stemming from the estimated variation in seller costs. However, transacted prices are much more concentrated.
As we incorporate search frictions (moving from right to left on the top row), we see that search frictions lead to substantially increased mark-ups, and somewhat higher transaction prices and price dispersion. Seller di¤erentiation, however, is an even more potent force for pricing power and (transaction) price dispersion. Incorporating our estimate of perceived seller di¤erentiation leads to roughly the same amount of seller pricing power (median margins of right around $4), as our calculations that incorporate the search frictions in the "Before" period. Indeed, as we …nd that once seller di¤erentiation is present, the "After" search regime actually leads to more intense price competition, and somewhat less price dispersion, than is present with no search frictions. The reason, of course, is that sellers are selected into the (limited) consideration set on the basis of their price.
Discussion
We have also considered a number of other permutations of the model. In one exercise, we investigated the importance of obfuscation or …ltering on the platform. As mentioned earlier, it is not uncommon to see on eBay search results that do not perfectly match the item that the potential buyer was likely to be interested in. For example, a search for iPhone may show, in addition to some iPhone listings, some iPhone covers, iPhone chargers, or other accessories. The case is similar with Halo Reach. We thus examine the consequences of perfecting this aspect of the platform, and "…lling" these search results slots with listing of the same item, thus increasing the size of the consideration sets L i . These results are not reported, but we found the e¤ects were not large, and in fact make prices (and margins) go up slightly relative to the "After" search regime. This is because the increase in the size of consideration sets has two e¤ects. One e¤ect is the increase in competition, which incentivizes sellers to lower prices. The second e¤ect is that larger consideration sets make it "easier"for sellers to enter the consideration set, and thus reduces their incentive to lower prices in order to become visible to buyers. The results suggest that the latter e¤ect appears to (slightly) dominate.
As a further exercise, we also investigated the extent to which observed price dispersion was mostly driven by cost dispersion as opposed to dispersion in seller margins. Recall that in traditional search models such as Stahl (1989) , all of the dispersion in prices comes from variation in margins, and indeed the price elasticity of (residual) demand is determined just so in equilibrium to keep sellers indi¤erent across a wide range of prices. The key feature of (residual) demand that leads to prices being more dispersed than costs is log-convexity -that is, enough curvature of demand that cost increases are passed through into prices more than one-for-one (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013) . Based on our demand estimates, optimal margins are lower for higher cost sellers (see Figure 4) , meaning that equilibrium price dispersion is less than cost dispersion. We also have experimented with a range of more ‡exible demand estimates, obtaining the same result, and may discuss them at more length in future versions of the paper.
Conclusion
This paper has explored search frictions in online commerce, and the role of search design in reducing them. Our analysis has been narrow in the sense that we have focused almost exclusively on pricing, and price search. One concern with trying to promote price competition very aggressively is that it may lead sellers to behave strategically in ways that mitigate the competitive incentives. Ellison and Ellison's (2009) study of how sellers listing prices on Pricewatch engage in various forms of "add-ons", "up-selling" and "bait-and-switch" techniques is particularly telling in this regard, and suggests why there can be endogenous limits on the intensity of price competition.
Our analysis also has focused on competition in homogeneous product categories. One of the main features of internet commerce is that it has vastly expanded the set of products available by allowing consumers to purchase niche items, the so-called "long tail." Search design plays an essential role in matching consumers to products when there are many, many products to consider and consumers may not even be aware of them. Trying to assess how alternative search designs a¤ect this matching process, and the interaction with price search, would be an interesting topic for future research. Figure shows changes in browsing experience between the "Before" (4/6/11-5/18/11) and "After" (8/1/11-9/20/11) periods. Top panel shows distributions of the size of the consideration set, L. That is, the number of relevant items shown on the search results page (the default in the "Before" period) or the product page (the default in the "After" period). Bottom panel plots the distributions of the density of the number of clicks per search session, prior to eventual purchase of a relevant Halo Reach listing. A click only counts if it led to eBay loading a page. We start counting clicks from the first "Halo Reach" search event. A relevant item is a new, fixed price listing identified as the Halo Reach video game. Figure plots implied demand curves based on our model estimates. The x-axis is the per-search probability of being transacted. This probability is the probability of appearing in the consideration set multiplied by the probability of being transacted conditional on being in the consideration set. We use kernel-weighted local polynomial regression to estimate the curves. The Before (4/6/11-5/18/11) and After (8/1/11-9/20/11) distributions of list prices, as well as the predicted price distribution after the platform re-design, which is based on our estimates. Recall that our estimates rely on the "before" data only (except for the use of the "after" data to estimate gamma). presents summary statistics at the category level before and after the re-design of the platform, which was implemented first on May 19, 2011, but effectively became important on July 2, 2011. The "Before" period spans 4/6/11-5/18/11, and the After period spans 8/1/11-9/20/11 (as mentioned in the text, we exclude the month of July to allow time for sellers to respond to the platform redesign). To reduce concerns regarding item composition, within each category we choose the 10 products that appeared most often in search results during the week before July 2, and report statistics for each category using a weighted average across these 10 products. 1 Each time an item is transacted, we find all the prices for that product that were available at the time of purchase. We then calculate the price percentile as the transacted price's percentile in the distribution of available prices. These results show the model estimates. Demand parameters are obtained using data from the "before" period only. Pricing predictions for the "after" period use browsing data from the "after" period as described in the main text. 1 The price elasticities in the "before" period are based on the demand estimates. In the "after" period, the same demand estimates are used, but prices also affect the inclusion of the item in the consideration set, and the price elasticities we report are those that combine both effects, as the combined effect dictates the pricing incentives. The top and bottom rows provide a benchmark, by reporting the estimated margins and purchase rate shown in Table 3 . The middle rows break down the effect of the platform change to the three components that have changed between the before and after periods, illustrating that the change in gamma is responsible for essentially the entire effect. 1 Purchase rate is defined as the share of relevant search queries that end up in transacting one of the Halo Reach posted price items. The labels "Seller Differentiation" and "Limited Seller Differentiation" refer to whether we include a seller-specific logit error. The version with differentiation keeps the error, while the "Limited Differentiation" specification assumes a nested logit model in which all "inside goods" are in the same nest and the sigma parameter is 0.2. Each column refers to a different platform design: the "Before" regime, the "After" regime, and a counterfactual regime in which consumers are shown the entire set of (relevant) listings available on the platform. 
